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NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendants request this Honorable Court review a
final Order Denying their Motion to Set Aside Default and Default
Judgment entered on the 26th day of August, 1985, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by denying

the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment?
2.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the Trial

Court's Default Judgment entered herein?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendants' counsel

engaged

in

several conver-

sations with the Plaintiff's counsel prior to the commencement of
these proceedings in an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the
parties' respective claims.

(R. 32)

Defendants' counsel made a settlement offer to Plaintiff's counsel on behalf of the Defendants approximately one
month prior to the filing of the Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 33)
The

Defendants'

counsel

asserts

that

Plaintiff's

counsel, during the conversation, stated he believed said offer
acceptable but that the Plaintiff was without the State of Utah
and

he would

advise

Defendants' counsel

of

the

Plaintiff's

decision at the earliest possible date but failed to contact the
Defendants' counsel thereafter. (R. 33)

1

The Plaintiff's counsel

disputed that the Defendants made a settlement offer to the
Plaintiff. (R. 40)
The Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on the 14th day of
March,

1985.

(R.

2)

The

Defendants, Allwin W.

Pierce and

Vennadel Pierce, were served with a copy of the Plaintiff's
Complaint and Summons on the 30th day of Marchf 1985. (R. 7-12)
The Summons demanded that the Defendants' answer the Plaintiff's
Complaint within thirty (30) days of service upon them. (R. 7,
10)
Counsel for the Defendants and counsel for the Plaintiff engaged in several conversations subsequent to the filing of
the Plaintiff's Complaint on the 14th day of March, 1985, and the
subject of those conversations was settlement negotiations. (R.
38, 40)
The Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce,
delivered the Summons and Complaint to their counsel on the 5th
day of April, 1985. (R. 33)
The

Defendants'

counsel

immediately

telephoned

the

Plaintiff's counsel and tendered to him another offer of settlement at which time the Plaintiff's counsel stated that he would
contact the Plaintiff and inform the Defendants' counsel of the
Plaintiff's decision regarding said offer. (R. 33)

The Plain-

tiff's counsel disputed that such an offer was made. (R. 40)
Although the Plaintiff's counsel denies that "settlement offers"
were made on behalf of the Defendants he acknowledged that the
parties were engaged in settlement negotiations. (R. 38, 40)
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The Defendants' counsel asserts that on the 17th day of
April, 1985, in absence of acceptance or rejection by the Plaintiff of the Defendants' offer of settlement, he contacted the
Plaintiffs counsel at which time the Plaintiff's counsel informed
him that he had been unable to convey said offer to the Plaintiff
but would do so at the earliest possible date. (R. 33)
The Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that he spoke to
the Defendants' counsel on April 17, 1985, but asserted that
during said phone conversation he indicated that it was his
intention to

"actively

litigate" the action and expected an

Answer from the Defendants' counsel prior to the expiration of
the time provided to answer, (R. 40)

Plaintiff's counsel assert-

ed that the Defendants' counsel did not request nor did he grant
the Defendants' counsel any extension of time in which to answer
the Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 40)
On April 22, 1985, the Plaintiff's counsel wrote a
letter

to

the

Defendants'

counsel

thanking

the Defendants'

counsel for his phone call of April 17, 1985, in regard to the
law suit. (R. 43)

The second paragraph of that letter states

"Unfortunately, I was unable to communicate with Mr. Katz prior
to his leaving town." (R. 43)

The letter did not indicate why

the Plaintiff's counsel was supposed to communicate with the
Plaintiff.

(R. 43)

In the third paragraph of the April 22,

1985, letter the Plaintiff's counsel stated that it was his
intention to "actively litigate" this matter and that his file
indicated that the Defendants' "...answer was due on or before
April 20, 1985." and that if no Answer had been received by April

3

20th, that an Entry of Default and Default Judgment would be
submitted to the Court. (R. 43)
The Defendants1 counsel received this letter on the
23rd day of April, 1985. (R. 33)
The Defendants1 counsel immediately commenced preparation of the Defendants1 Answer and Counterclaim but such preparation was difficult and time consuming inasmuch as two of the
Defendants named herein were residing without the State of Utah.
(R. 34)
All Defendants answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and
counterclaimed against him on the 30th day of May, 1985. (R.
18-30)
The Defendants1 default was entered on the 30th day of
April, 1985. (R. 13)
On the 17th day of May, 1985, the Plaintiff's counsel
submitted a Default Judgment and his Affidavit of Costs and
Attorney's Fees. (R. 14-17)
The Uniform Real Estate Contract provides that the
buyers shall make monthly payments upon the balance of Thirty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($33,500.00) in the sum of
Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00), and that a "Twenty
Dollar

($20.00) late charge after the 10th day of any month"

shall be paid by the buyers. (R. 6)
The Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph five, asserts that
the Defendants had failed to make the monthly pciyments for the
months of December, 1984, and January, February and March, 1985,
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in the sum of Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00) per
month. (R. 3)
Paragraph seven of the Plaintiff's Complaint asserts
that "Defendants jointly and severally owe the Plaintiff the sum
of

$1,580.00

for the arrearages

and

late payments described

above." (R. 3)
In the Prayer for Relief of the Plaintiff's Complaint
the Plaintiff prayed for judgment against the Defendants jointly
and severally in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Eighty
Dollars ($1,580.00). (R. 4)
Paragraph two of the Prayer for Relief of the Plaintiff's Complaint requested "...judgment against the Defendants
jointly and severally in the amount of such additional lease
arrearages as may accrue during the pendency of these proceedings, including late payments." (Emphasis Added) (R. 4)
The Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees submitted by
the Plaintiff's counsel stated that said counsel spent 6.67 hours
in the prosecution of the matter which included review of the
initial file material supplied by the Plaintiff, preparation of
the Complaint, preparation of the Summons and preparation of the
default pleadings. (R. 14-15)

The Plaintiff's attorney asserted

by his Affidavit that his regular hourly rate was Seventy-Five
Dollars

($75.00) per hour "...which is a reasonable rate for

attorneys practicing in this area." and that Five Hundred Dollars
($500.00) was a reasonable fee for attorney's services performed
on the Plaintiff's behalf in the action.
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The Default Judgment executed and entered by the Court
on May 17, 1985, against the Defendant, Allwin W. Pierce, was in
the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Dollars ($2,370.00)
representing

contract

arrearages,

including

late

penalties

accrued for the period of December, 1984, through May, 1985,
inclusive.

(R. 16)

Said judgment also awarded the Plaintiff

attorney's fees in the amount of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00)
and costs incurred in the action in the amount of Sixty-Six
Dollars Fifty Cents ($66.50) for a total judgment of Two Thousand
Six Hundred Eighty-Six Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,686.50). (R. 17)
On the 30th day of May, 1985, the Defendants Answered
the Plaintiff's Complaint and Counterclaimed against him. (R.
18-31).
On the 4th day of June, 1985, the Plaintiff's counsel
by letter notified the Defendants' counsel that the Defendants'
Default had been entered. (R. 34-35)
The Defendants' counsel immediately commenced preparation of the pleadings necessary to set aside the Default Judgment. (R. 34-35)
The Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and Default
Judgment and Affidavit in support thereof were filed on the 26th
day of June, 1985. (R. 32, 36)
The hearing upon the Defendants' Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment was originally scheduled for the
26th day of July, 1985, but was continued upon the motion of
Plaintiff's counsel because the Defendants' counsel was involved
in a trial which had continued an extra day. (R. 46, 48)
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The motion was continued without prejudice to either
party and eventually heard on

the 16th day of August, 1985,

whereupon the Court denied the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment. (R. 51, 54, 58)

The Court executed

and entered the Order denying the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment on the 26th day of August, 1985.
The

Plaintiff

filed

his

reply

the Defendants1

to

Counterclaim on the 26th day of August, 1985. (R. 55-56)
The Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce,
filed their Notice of Appeal on the 23rd day of September, 1985.
(R. 62)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court abused its discretion by denying the
Defendants1

Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment

because the Plaintiff's counsel knew that the Defendants disputed
Plaintiff's

claims, the

parties

were

engaged

in

settlement

negotiations both prior to and subsequent to the service upon the
Defendants of the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons, the Plaintiff's April

22, 1985, letter, received

by

the Defendants'

counsel on April 23, 1985, demanded the Complaint be answered by
April 20, 1985, despite the requirement of the Summons that the
Complaint be answered within thirty (30) days.
Defendants were diligent

Furthermore, the

in preparation of their Answer and

Counterclaim in light of the fact that two (2) of the Defendants
resided without the State of Utah.

No injustice or inequity to

the Plaintiff will result should the Defendants' Motion to Set
Aside Default and Default Judgment be granted.
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The Trial Court entered Judgment against the Defendant,
Allwin W. Pierce, in the principal sum of Two Thousand Three
Hundred

Seventy

Dollars

($2,370.00)

for

contract

arrearages

accrued for the period December, 1984, through May, 1985, despite
the Prayer for Relief of the Complaint that the Plaintiff be
awarded judgment against the Defendants in the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Dollars ($1,580.00).

The Trial Court

failed to comply with Rules 54(c) (2) and 55(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the Defendants engaged in several conversations prior to the filing of the
Plaintiff's

Complaint

respective claims.

regarding

settlement

of

the

parties'

The Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on the

14th day of March, 1985, and served upon two of the Defendants,
Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, on the 30th day of March,
1985.

Thereafter, counsel continued

to engage in settlement

negotiations.
The Default of the Defendants, Allwin W. Pierce and
Vennadel Pierce, was entered on the 30th day of April, 1985, and
Default Judgment was entered against them on the 17th day of May,
1985, in the total sum of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-Six
Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,686.50).
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All Defendants Answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and
Counterclaimed against him on the 30th day of May, 1985.
The Defendants filed their Motion to Set Aside Default
and Default Judgment on the 26th day of Junef 1985, pursuant to
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following
Reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect;
•.. or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for [reason] (1) ...
Hot more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was
Entered or taken.
It is not disputed that the Defendants timely filed
their Motion to set Aside Default and Default Judgment.

The

Default Judgment was entered on the 17th day of May, 1985, and
the Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
was filed on the 26th day of June, 1985. (R. 16, 36)
The T^iai Court is accorded a broad latitude of discretion in ruling upon motions presented under Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co.,
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
123 Utah 2d 416v 260 P.2d 741 (1953).

The Supreme Court of the

State of Utah has frequently stated that it will reverse the
trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is clearly
established.

A movant must

show
9

that

he

has

used

"...due

diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control."

Airkem Intermountain,

Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973).
Although there is a broad latitude of discretion vested
in the trial court, that "discretion should be exercised in
furtherance of justice and should incline towcird in granting
relief in a doubtful case to the end that a party may have a
hearing."

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 2d 416, 260 P. 2d

741 (1953).

In Mayhew, supra, this Court stated, "...it is quite

uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate
a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or
excuse for the Defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside."
It is undisputed that counsel for all parties were
engaged

in negotiations both prior to and subsequent to the

service of the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons upon the Defendants on March 30, 1985, although Plaintiff's counsel disputed
that the Defendants made a settlement offer. (R. 32-33, 38-41)
The Defendants delivered

the Summons and Complaint

to their

counsel on April 5, 1985, whereupon Defendants' counsel immediately telephoned the Plaintiff's counsel and tendered him another
offer at which time the Plaintiff's counsel stated that he would
contact the Plaintiff and then inform the Defendants' counsel of
the decision regarding Defendants' offer.

On April 17, 1985, in

absence of acceptance or rejection of the Defendants' offer, the
Defendants'

counsel

contacted

the
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Plaintiff's

counsel

who

informed him that he had been unable to convey the offer to the
Plaintiff but would do so at the earliest possible date. (R. 33)
Assuming, as asserted by Plaintiff's counsel, that he
had informed the Defendants' counsel of his intention to "actively litigate" the matter on April 17, 1985, it was unreasonable to
expect that the Defendants' counsel could file an Answer to the
Plaintiff's Complaint before April 20f 1985, as demanded by the
Plaintiff's counsel.
The letter from Plaintiff's counsel to the Defendants'
counsel dated April 22, 1985, and received by Defendants' counsel
April 23, 1985, stated that the Answer was due on or before April
20, 1985.

The Summons, required the Defendants to Answer the

Plaintiff's complaint within thirty (30) days from service upon
them.

The Answer would have been due April 29, 1985.
Arguably, the Defendants had time to Answer the Plain-

tiff's Complaint.

Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby Larson,

resided without the State of Utah.

(R. 34)

The Defendants'

counsel stated in his Affidavit that following receipt of the
April 22, 1985, letter he immediately commenced preparation of
the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim but such preparation was
difficult and time consuming because two (2) of the Defendants
were residing without the State of Utah. (R. 34)
Necessarily, the communication between an attorney and
his clients residing in another state in a law suit of this
nature is more cumbersome and time consuming than that between an
attorney and a client who resides locally.

The attorney does not

have the benefit of a personal interview with the client which
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permits free, in depth inquiry into the factual basis of the
client's claims and defenses.

Such

inquiry

is necessary to

insure proper pleading of the Defendants' positions and promotes
the integrity of the judicial process by mitigating the risk of
frivolous and inapplicable claims and defenses which lead to
unjust results.
The Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim was filed on
May 30, 1985, thirteen (13) days after the Default Judgment was
entered against the Defendant, Allwin W. Pierce. (R. 18-30)
It

is

significant

that

the

Plaintiff's

counsel

submitted his Entry of Default to the Court on April 22, 1985,
more than a week prior to the time the Summons required that the
answer be filed and the same day he drafted the letter demanding
that the Defendants' answer the Plaintiff's Complaint by April
20, 1985. (R. 41)
the

Plaintiff's

The Defendants' counsel had no knowledge that
counsel was

pursuing

a default

against

the

Defendants until April 23, 1985. (R. 33-34)
Furthermore, it may be implied from paragraph two of
the April 22, 1985, letter that a settlement offer was pending
because the Plaintiff's counsel was to contact his client and it
was "Unfortunate" he was unable to do so prior to the Plaintiff
leaving town. (R. 43)

The paragraph supports the Defendants'

counsel's assertion that he had made and was awaiting a response
to a settlement offer.
There

are no mailing certificates upon the default

documents submitted

to the Court by the Plaintiff nor other

evidence indicating that the Plaintiff's counsel notified the
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Defendants' counsel of the course of conduct he was pursuing.
Common ethics and professional courtesy

among the practicing

members of the bar, under these circumstances, dictated that the
Plaintiff's
opportunity

counsel

permit

the

Defendants'

counsel

the

to communicate with his clients and prepare his

pleadings.
The

Plaintiff's

counsel

notified

the

Defendants'

counsel of the entry of the Default Judgment on June 4, 1985. (R.
34-35)
The Defendants' counsel immediately commenced preparation of the pleadings necessary to set aside the Default Judgment. (R. 34-35)
The settlement negotiations, the absence of acceptance
or rejection of the Defendants' settlement offers, the demand
that the Plaintiff's Complaint be answered by April 20, 1985, in
the

letter

from Plaintiff's

counsel

received

by Defendants'

counsel on April 23, 1985, despite the thirty (30) day Summons
and the fact that two (2) of the Defendants resided without the
State of Utah, taken together, show that the Defendants used due
diligence and that they were prevented from appearing by circumstances beyond their control.

Airkem, supra.

In Helgesen v.

Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981), this Court stated:
It is not uncommon in the practice of
the law that when parties are negotiating settlement and one party files a
lawsuit to bring pressure to bear, the
other party is not strictly held to the
time requirements of the rules of
procedure since settlement talk continues to the day of trial and a few days'
delay has little or no effect on
when the trial date will be set.
13

The discretion of the trial court should be exercised
liberally in favor of the defaulting party in order to provide
him his day

in court.

Mayhew, supra.

The interest of the

Plaintiff should also be taken into consideration and the judgment should not be set aside if to do so would work an injustice
or inequity to him.
767 (Utah 1978).

Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589 P. 2d

The Plaintiff did not demonstrate that to set

aside the Default Judgment entered against the Defendants would
be unjust or result in inequity to him.
Furthermore, at

the

time

of

the

hearing

upon

the

Defendants' motion, the Plaintiff had not replied to the Counterclaim of the Defendants, filed some ten (10) weeks earlier.
The

Plaintiff's

counsel

knew

that

the

Plaintiff's

Complaint was disputed and had indicated his intention to "actively litigate" the matter.

Despite his knowledge that the

Plaintiff's claims were disputed and that the Defendants were
represented by counsel he submitted his "Entry of Default" to the
Court on April 22, 1985, and this was executed by the clerk on
April 30, 1985.
Fundamental

fairness and justice require, under the

circumstances of this case, that the Entry of Default and Default
Judgment against the Defendants be set aside and the case remanded to the Trial Court for a determination of whether the Defendants have presented a meritorious defense by their Answer.
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POINT II
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The Plaintiff's

Complaint, paragraph

five, asserted

that the Defendants had failed to make monthly payments for the
months of December, 1984, and January, February, and March, 1985,
in the sum of Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00). (R.
3)

Paragraph seven of the Plaintiff's Complaint asserted that

the "Defendants jointly and severally owe the Plaintiff the sum
of

$1,580.00

for the arrearages

and

late payments described

above."
Paragraph two of the Prayer for Relief of the Plaintiff's Complaint requested, "...judgment against the Defendants
jointly and severally in the amount of such additional lease
arrearages as may accrue during the pendency of these proceedings, including late payments." (Emphasis Added) (R. 4)
The Default Judgment entered on May 17, 1985, awarded
the Plaintiff

"...Judgment against the Defendants, Allwin W.

Pierce, jointly and severally in the amount of $2,370, said sum
representing

contract

arrearages,

including

late

penalties,

accrued for the period December, 19 84 through May 1985, inclusive."

(R. 16)
Rule 54(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:
Judgment by Default.
A judgment by
default shall not be different in kind
from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for
judgment.
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Rule 55 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Judgment by default may be entered as
follows:
(1) By the Clerk. When the
plaintiff's claim against a defendant is
for a sum certain or for a sum which can
by computation be made certain, and the
defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by
personal service outside of this state,
the clerk upon request of the plaintiff
shall enter judgment for the amount due
and costs against the defendants, if he
had been defaulted for failure to appear
and if he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the Court. In all other cases
the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into
effect, it is necessary to take an
account or to determine the amount of
damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an
investigation of any other matter, the
court may conduct such hearings or order
such references as it deems necessary
and proper.
Unquestionably,

the

Trial

Court

entered

judgment

against the Defendants in a sum in excess of that demanded by the
Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 2-4, 16-17)
The Default Judgment entered against the Defendants was
in violation

of

Rule

54(c)(2)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure by granting the Plaintiff judgment in a sum in excess
of that demanded by the Plaintiff's Complaint.
The Trial Court failed to follow Rule 55(b)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that it did not take steps
"...necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of
damages...." nor have a hearing thereupon.
16

In Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), this
Court stated:
Rule 54(c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the trial
courts in entering judgments against
defaulting parties. Courts are not at
liberty to deviate from those rules just
because one party is in default and is
not entitled to be heard on the merits
of the case.
Clearly,

the

Default

Judgment

entered

against

the

Defendants was well in excess of the amount prayed in the Plaintiff's Complaint and the Trial Court did not follow the prescribed Rules in awarding the Plaintiff his judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court abused its discretion by denying the
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
because the Plaintiff's counsel knew that the Defendants disputed
Plaintiff's

claims, the

parties

were

engaged

in

settlement

negotiations both prior to and subsequent to the service upon the
Defendants of the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons, the Plaintiff's April

22, 1985, letter, received

by

the Defendants'

counsel on April 23, 1985, demanded the Complaint be answered by
April 20, 1985, despite the requirement of the Summons that the
Complaint be answered within thirty (30) days.

The day before

the

demanding

Defendants'

counsel

received

the

letter

the

Complaint be answered the Plaintiff's counsel submitted his Entry
of Default to the Court.
Furthermore,

the

Defendants

were

diligent

in

preparation of their Answer and Counterclaim in light of the fact

that two (2) of the Defendants resided without the State of Utah.
No injustice or inequity to the Plaintiff will result should the
Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment be
granted.
The Trial Court entered Judgment against the Defendant,
Allwin W. Pierce, in the principal sum of Two Thousand Three
Hundred

Seventy

Dollars

($2,370.00)

for

contract

arrearages

accrued for the period December, 1984, through May, 1985, despite
the Prayer for Relief of the Complaint that the Plaintiff be
awarded judgment against the Defendants in the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Dollars ($1,580.00).

The Trial Court

failed to comply with Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The Defendants seek reversal of the Trial Court's Order
denying their Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
and an Order setting aside the Entry of Default and Default
Judgment.
awarded

Additionally, the Defendants request that they be

their

costs

and

attorney's

fees

incurred

upon

the

prosecution of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted tliia^&th day of January, 1985.

^Stiksfy'
Attorney for Appellants
100 Harmon BuiLding
3540 South 4000(we<Jt
West Valley CityT'Utah 84120
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STAN KATZ,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

Docket No. 20924

Defendants and Appellants.
ooOoo
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of January, 1985,
I delivered to AMS four (4) copies of Appellants1 Brief for hand
delivery to Raymond Scott Berry, Green & Berry, Attorneys for
Respondent, at 900 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.

ANDREW^. BERRY XTR.
Attorney for/Appallants
100 Harmon Bfuildijng
3540 S o u t h 4XK)0 West
West V a l l e y C i t r / , Utah 84120

64007
. ft ©<*>»'**
GREEN & BERRY
Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-5650
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,

SUMMONS

c^s-\y^

Civil No.

VS.

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNJ\DEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON AND RUBY )
LARSON,
UPON'

"

Defendants.

sm

—

"

—

'

C0m

^^m^

-•

"

-

•

• *

> * \

:

>

/

PfiEc. &L com
TV, UTAH
DEPUTY

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:

Us^Oc t o . <RM9oS J

Allwin W.

•

•—-

Pierce, 1685 W. Whitlock Avenue, salt Lake City, Utah.
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the
Clerk of the above-entitled Court, an answer in writing to the
Complaint filed in the above-entitled case, and to serve upon or
mail to Raymond Scott Berry Plaintiff's attorney, 10 Exchange
Place, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said
answer, within 30 days after service of this summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said complaint, which has

Page -1-

been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is
hereby annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this

fck

Defendant's address:
1685 West Whitlock Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

day of March, 1985.

Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Buildii
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake"City, Utah 84111

Page -2-

OF UTAH

)

Y OF SALT LAKE )

CONSTABLE'S RETURN

ItRON GORDON

, being first duly sworn on oath depose and sayt

I afr? a duly appointed Deputy Constable of the Hurray Precinct County of Salt Lake
1

of Utah, a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of

e herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action*
I received the within and hereto annexed,SUMMONS & COMPLAINT
I

• on the 13 day of

, 19 85, and served the same upon,PIERCE, ALLUIN U»

:hin named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said
INS & COMPLAINT

, by delivering to and leaving a true copy of said SUMMONS & COMPLAINT
, a suitable person over the age of

the defendant with, PIERCE, VENNADEL, WIFE
?arstRESIDING

at the usual place of RESIDENCE

30 day of MARCH

of said defendant, personally

,1985 , at 1685 U< WHITLOCK AVE*

\y of Salt Lake, State of Utah*
I further certify that at the time of such service of the SUMMONS & COMPLAINT
iorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official title thereto*
Dated this 30 day of MARCH

, 1985

JOHN A* SINDT
Constable Murray Precinct

Deputy
cribed and sworn to before me this
©amission Expires* April

30 day of MARCH

1, 1988

>f^S
Notary Vj&i\z

Service*: %

3*75

Mileage'

4.50

$

\ %
! %

\ %

TOTAL ! $

>?

15

MA

8.25

«r?Tm;^

Opun% of Salt Lake

o**<>QG

t(
GREEN & BERRY
Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)

V>fe

363-5650

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,

SUMMONS

vs.

Civil No.

T*r

ALLWIN W. PIERCE,_VENNADEL
.PTpppF, K-PMT S. LARSON AND RUBY
LARSON,
Defendants.

d. ss"-te£&
/\-itii-<

/
S.i IN CO.VSIHBLE'

MUHRA, i- nEC. O.L. UJ'J: r, V, J,7„,

DEPUTY
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED

1685

DEFENDANT:

Vennadel

Pierce,

Whitlock Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah,
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the

Clerk of the above-entitled Court, an answer in writing to the
Complaint filed in the above-entitled case, and to serve upon or
mail to Raymond Scott Berry Plaintiff's attorney, 10 Exchange
Place, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said
answer, within 30 days after service of this summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said complaint, which has

Page -1-

it

been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is
hereby annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this

/ c*^ day of March, 1985.

Defendant's address:
1685 West Whitlock Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attbfney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Page -2-

nr UIAH
Y Or SALT LAKE )

CONSTABLE'S RETURN

It RON GORDON

* being first duly sworn on oath depose and say*

I af>< a duly appointed Deputy Constable ef the Hurray Precinct County of Salt Lake
k

of Utah* a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of

e herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action*
I received the within and hereto annexed*SUMMONS & COMPLAINT
I

f

• on the 13 day of

19 85* and served the same upon*PIERCE> MENNAICL

bin named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said
* by delivering to a m leaving a true copy of said SUMMONS & COMPLAINT

INS * COMPLAINT

'he defendant with* PIERCE• VENNftDEL
>ars,RESIDING

• a suitable person over the age of

at the usual place of RESIDENCE

30 day of MARCH

of said defendant, personally

,1985 * at 1685 U* WHITLOCK AVE*

7 of Salt Lake, State of Utah*
I further certify that at the time of such service of the SUMMONS & COMPLAINT
iorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official title thereto*
Dated this 30 day of MARCH

• 1985

JOHN A* SIHDT
Constable Murray Precinct

Deputy
iribed and sworn to before me this 30 day of MARCH
jmmission Expires* April

1* 1988
Notary PuMTic

I StVe of m
Service4* $
Mileage*

$

I

$

•

$

i

i

TOTAL: $

6

15 MA

3*75

3*?£

/ I

riiCD in c t r r v ' , r

IISEH

rrr,

c

ll5sf.!"E5

GREEN & BERRY

Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-5650

/:

P^ijjllN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
J

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

c

VS.

Civil NO.

85l806

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and RUBY )
L. LARSON,
Defendants.

Plaintiff complains of Defendants and for a cause of
action alleges as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff is now and was at all times mentioned

herein a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

That Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce

are now and were at all times mentioned herein residents of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

Defendants Kent S. Larson and Ruby

L. Larson were, at the times mentioned herein, residents of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Plaintiff alleges upon his information and belief

that Defendants Kent S. Larson and Ruby L. Larson on or about
January 15, 1985, ceased to reside in Salt Lake County, State of
Page -1-

Utah.
4.

That on or about June 9, 1984, Plaintiff and

Defendants entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract whereby
Defendants purchased from Plaintiff certain real property
consisting of a family residence located at 342 South 10th West
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

A true and correct copy of said

Uniform Real Estate Contract, including a legal description of
the above-mentioned property, is attached hereto and made a part
hereof by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit
5.

f, M

A.

That the above-mentioned Defendants have failed to

make the monthly payments called for by the Uniform Real Estate
Contract for the months of December, 1984, and January, February
and March, 1985.

The contract specifies that monthly payments

are to be in the amount of $375.00 per month.

In addition, the

above-mentioned Uniform Real Estate Contract specifies a $20.00
late charge for monthly payments made after the 10th day of any
calendar month.
6.

Plaintiff demanded that Defendants pay the

above-mentioned monthly payments, but said demands have been
refused and/or ignored by Defendants.
7.

Defendants jointly and severally owe Plaintiff the

sum of $1,580.00 for the arrearages and late payments described
above.
8.

Plaintiff further alleges on information and belief

that Defendants will fail to make additional monthly payments

Page -2-

required by the above-mentioned contract while this action is
pending.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Defendants jointly and severally as follows:
1.

For judgment against the Defendants jointly and

severally in the amount of $1,580.00.
2.

For judgment against the Defendants jointly and

severally in the amount of such additional lease arrearages as
may accrue during the pendency of these proceedings, including
late payments.
3.

For reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the

Plaintiff in pursuing this action and as provided for by the
above-mentioned contract, a reasonable attorney's fee accuring at
the rate of $75.00 per hour.
4.

For interest before and after judgment at the rate of

13% per annum as provided for by the contract, costs of court,
and such other and further relief as the court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.
DATED this fc*C day of March, 1985.
GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY

Raymond Scott Berry / )
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Plaintiff's address:
3703 Honeycut Road
Page -3-

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice."
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this

t

*

day of

^ - __,A.D,19ll
^/J^t_

by and between

frgjkJLhlLfrr.,

hereinafter designated as the Seller, and £ j
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for tijo consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
jSflli-MlJtt.
the county of —S

State of Utah, to-wit: B ^ X J ^ A i P P O 1 ^ - U X i l / « * T
ADDRESS

>«-^f%/*//**f *

> 3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum^pf
~7kl\r\ZZ f ^ w ^ > K o w j W FM* ifatjJtftoJ

__—

Dollars ( $ 3 ^ J £ 0 & J ^ )

payable at the office of Seller, his assigns ororder ~~~^~
strictly within the following times, to-wit: JLJu

C

A3L

1 t\<*»JbL^

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $__£)LIL_J

trio -fat*.C 4 H < . 4 ^ " # « 1*w <**i*f *•»]*»»%

VO

shall be paid as follows:

The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property.
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a company acceptable to the Sailer in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to nim.
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per
month until paid.
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
said premises, and that he will maintain said promises in good condition.
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within . T ^ v j A C M
days thereafter, the
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies:
**
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice,
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with
the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass
title to the Buyer subjeca thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may; have
accrued
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, mil III Till lii ill nl bin 111 j
j m jnilLii ~nP""f il li in 1 mini -• t1-- ^ " ' - i n t
"

n i

^

r , 1 1 T.bi1''i n P v l V , n " r '-)*' fill' ^ p * ; ' " M ) f t [ ] j - » j j ^ ^ ^ ; j ^ y - " i ^ ^ « • * • > • » • • • f••»•*'*•

Inmii nir
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•••[•—•

' J i r i t [jm
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20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto

.

21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or
•
-. . _i_i.„:_:_„. n^OAlaoinn
^f tha nrpinisfls covered hereby, or in pursuing any

APR

30 10 S7ftH# 65

H. 1>A
it. :
BY JLLI

GREEN & BERRY
Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-5650
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,

ENTRY OF DEFAULT

vs.

Civil No.

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON, and
RUBY LARSON,
Defendant.

Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, having
been regularly served with process and Complaint in the
above-entitled action, and having failed to answer or respond to
the same, the time to answer or respond having elapsed, and upon
motion of the Plaintiff, the default of Defendants Allwin W.
Pierce and Vennadel Pierce is hereby entered according to law.
DATED this

3 $

clay of April, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

H. D/X0N HfNDLEY

J
Clerk of the District Court
JK38

Page
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h

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

MAY 1 7 1985

GREEN & BERRY
Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)

By

D&puty Clerk

363-5650

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

&4. /97 A'? J ^

STAN KATZ,

7

Plaintiff,
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.

Civil No. C85-1606

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON, AND
RUBY LARSON,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant.
)

The Default of the Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and
Vennadel Pierce was duly entered according to law on April 30,
1985.

Said default having been entered, this Court hereby

enters Default Judgment against Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and
Vennadel Pierce as follows:
JUDGMENT
1.

Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against Defendants

Allwin W. Pierce, jointly and severally in the amount of
$2,370, said sum representing contract arrearages, including
late penalties, accrued for the period December, 1984 through
May 1985, inclusive.
2.

Paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract

between Plaintiffs and Defendants provides for an award of
reasonable attorney's fees.

Pursuant to that provision, this

-

Court awards Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees incurred in
the prosecution of this action in the amount of $500.00.
3.

Plaintiff is further awarded reasonable costs

incurred in this action in the amount of $66.50.
TOTAL JUDGMENT:
DATED this

/ /

$2686.50
day of May, 1985.
BY THE COURT;

Judge of the District Court
JK40

D=»^^

O

^

ANDREW B. BERRY JR. 0309
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR
Attorneys for Defendants
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 400
West Valley City, Utah 84120
7)
Telephone: 967-3700
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo

STAN KATZ,
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C 85 1606

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

Assigned to:
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants,
ooOoo
COME NOW the Defendants by and through their attorney,
Andrew

B.

Berry

Jr.,

answering

the

Plaintiff's

Complaint

as

allegations

of

follows:
1.

The

Defendants

admit

the

express

paragraph one the of Plaintiff's Complaint.
2.
Vennadel
State

The

Pierce

of

Defendants

are

Utah, but

admit

residents
deny

each

of

that Allwin

Pierce

and

Salt Lake County within

the

and

every

other

W.

allegation

of

paragraph two of the Plaintiff's Complaint.
3.

The Defendants admit that Kent S. Larson and Ruby

Larson are residents of the State of New Mexico, but deny each
and every other allegation of paragraph three of the Plaintiff's
Complaint.

4.
of

The Defendants admit that on or about the 9th day

June, 1984, the Plaintiff

and

the Defendants

entered

into

Uniform Real Estate Contract upon the real property situate at
342 South 1000 West in the City of Salt Lake in the County of
Salt Lake within the State of Utah, and that a true and correct
copy of

said Uniform

Real Estate Contract

is attached

to the

Plaintiff's Complaint but deny each and every other allegation of
paragraph

four

assert that

of

said

the

Plaintiff's

contract

Complaint

is of no

and

legal effect

affirmatively
and

voidable

inasmuch as it was procurred by the Plaintiff's fraud and false
representation of material facts.
5,

The Defendants admit that they have not made the

monthly payments under the Uniform Real Estate Contract for the
months of December, 1984, and January, February, March, 1985, and
that said Uniform Real Estate Contract specifies monthly payments
in the amount of Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($375.00) and
a late charge as set forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint but deny
each

and

every

other

allegation

of

paragraph

five

of

the

Plaintiff's Complaint and affirmatively assert that they are not
obligated to make said monthly payments inasmuch as the contract
is voidable and procurred by the Plaintiff's fraud and that the
Plaintiff made false representation of material fact knowing said
representations were false and for the purpose of defrauding the
Defendant.

Furthermore, the Defendants allege that they were not

obligated to make the payments specified in paragraph five of the
Plaintiff's Complaint inasmuch as the parties have effected an
accord and satisfication.

2

6.

The Defendants admit that Plaintiff has demanded

they make the above-mentioned monthly payments but deny each and
every

other

allegation

of

paragraph

six

of

Plaintifffs

the

Complaint and affirmatively assert that said Defendants are not
obligated to make said payments because the Uniform Real Estate
Contract

was

procurred

by

fraud

and

Furthermore, the Defendants affirmatively

misrepresentation.

assert that any duty

which may have existed to make said monthly payments was relieved
by the accord and satisfaction between the parties.
7.

The Defendants deny each and every allegation of

paragraph seven of the Plaintiff's Complaint.
8.
further
assert

The

payments
that

the

Defendants
pursuant

admit

to

Defendants

said
have

that

they

contract
no

shall

and

obligation

not

make

affirmatively
to

make

said

payments to the Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

first,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants assert that
the

Plaintiff's

Complaint

fails

relief may be granted.

3

to

state

a

claim

upon

which

WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

second,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that
the

Contract

upon

which

the

Plaintiff

is

suing

is

voidable

because it was procurred by the Plaintiff's fraud in that, inter
alia, the Plaintiff
the dwelling which

falsely represented to the Defendants that
is the

Contract was twenty-five
not in need of repair.

subject of the Uniform

Real Estate

(25) years old, in good condition and

The Defendants reasonably and justifiably

relied upon the Plaintiff's representation of material fact and
the Plaintiff made said representations knowing they were false
for the purpose of defrauding the Defendants.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

third,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that

4

the contract of which the Plaintiff is suing is voidable because
it

was

procurred

by

the

Plaintiff's

innocent

but

negligent

misrepresentation, inter alia, the dwelling was only twenty-five
(25) years old, in good condition and not in need of repair.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

fourth,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that
the contract alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint to have been
made by Defendants was so made without consideration.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

fifth,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that
there has been a total failure of consideration for the contract
in question.
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WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For
defense

to

his

the

sixth,

Plaintiff's

separate

and

Complaint

distinct

the

affirmative

Defendant,

Kent

S.

Larson, asserts that he did not execute nor did he authorize the
execution

of

the

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract

which

is

the

subject of this action.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For their

seventh, separate

and distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that
on or about the 15th day of January, 1985, the parties entered
into and fully performed an accord and satisfication.

The terms

of said accord and satisfaction were that the Defendants herein
would

quit-claim

all right, title and

interest

in the subject

real property dwelling to the Plaintiff and thereupon would be
released from further obligation in law and equity and from the
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terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which is the subject of
this action.
Thereafter,

the

property and dwelling

Defendants

quit-claimed

to the Plaintiff

said

real

and the Plaintiff took

possession thereof fully performing the terms of said accord and
satisfaction.
The
property
Lake

Plaintiff

subsequently

for sale in the classified

Tribune

on

the

first, second,

advertised

said

real

advertisments of the Salt
third

and

fourth

days of

February, 1985.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorneyfs
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

eighth,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that
the Plaintiff has failed to properly notify them of their default
and

his

election

of

remedy

pursuant

to

the

provisions

of

paragraph 16 of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section

7

7 8-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

ninth,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that
the

Plaintiff's

claim

is barred

by

the

equitable

doctrine

of

estoppel.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For

their

tenth,

separate

and

distinct

affirmative

defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that
the Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the equitable doctrine of
waiver.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
For their eleventh, separate and distinct affirmative
defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint the Defendants allege that

8

the Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the equitable doctrine of
Laches.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed with prejudice upon
the merits and that the Defendants be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs of court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-27-56

and

such

other

and

further

relief

as

this

Court

determines just, equitable and proper.
COUNTERCLAIM
COME NOW the Defendants

(hereinafter Counterclaimants)

counterclaiming against the Plaintiff as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

The Counterclaimants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel

Pierce, are residents of Salt Lake County within the State of
Utah.
2.

The Counterclaimants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby L.

Larson, are residents of the State of New Mexico.
3.

The Plaintiff

is a resident of Salt Lake County

within the State of Utah.
4.
action

The

real property

situate at 342 South

which

is the

1000 West Street

subject

of

this

is in Salt Lake

County within the State of Utah.
5.

On

or

about

the

9th

day

of

June,

1984,

the

Counterclaimants, as purchasers, and the Plaintiff, as vendor,
entered

into

a Uniform

purchase of the

Real

real property

Estate

Contrct

situate

for

the

at 342 South

Street in Salt Lake County within the State of Utah.

9

sale

and

1000 West

6.

The

above-referenced

Plaintiff, prior
contract,

to

falsely

the

execution

represented

of
to

the
the

Counterclaimants that the dwelling upon said real property was no
older than twenty-five (25) years and in execellent condition not
in need of repair when, in fact, said dwelling is in excess of
fifty (50) years old and in need of extensive repair.
7.

The Plaintiff used said false representations to

induce the Counterclaimants to enter into the above-referenced
Uniform Real Estate Contract knowing his representations to be
false and material.
8.

The Counterclaimants would not have entered into

said Uniform Real Estate Contract had they been informed of the
true age and condition of said dwelling but for said inducement.
9.

The Counterclaimants acted reasonably in relying

upon the representations of the Plaintiff and were overreached
thereby.
10.

The

Plaintiff

falsely

represented

to

the

Counterclaimants, Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce, that they
could quit-claim their interest to the Counterclaimants, Kent S.
Larson and Ruby Larson, thereby releasing Allwin W. Pierce and
Vennadel Pierce, from all obligations in law and equity to pay
the sums due and owing under the above-referenced Uniform Real
Estate Contract.
11.

The Plaintiff used said false representations to

induce

the Counterclaimants

Estate

Contract knowing

his

to enter

into

representations

material.

10

said Uniform
to be

Real

false and

12.

The

Counterclaimants,

Allwin

W.

Pierce

and

Vennadel Pierce, would not have entered into said Uniform Real
Estate Contract had they been informed of the true effect of said
Uniform Real Estate Contract and Quit-Claim Deed and but for said
inducement.
13.

The

Counterclaimants,

Allwin

W.

Pierce

and

Vennadel Pierce, acted reasonably in relying upon the Plaitniff's
representations and were overreached thereby.
14.

The Counterclaimants are entitled to rescission of

said Uniform

Real Estate Contract

and

the return of all

sums

heretofore tendered to the Plaintiff.
15.
his

fraud

entered

The Plaintiff is liable in exemplary damages for

upon

the

the

sum

in

Counterclaimants
of

Fifty

and

Thousand

judgment
Dollars

should

be

($50,000.00)

therefore.
16.
attorney's

The

fees

Plaintiff

incurred

is

herein

liable
to

the

for

all

costs

and

Counterclaimants

and

judgment should be entered in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) therefore, but subject to amendment at trial.
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimants pray

judgment against

the Plaintiff as set forth below.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
17.

The Counterclaimants reallege and incorporate as

though fully set forth herein each and every allegation of their
First Cause of Action.
18.
Plaintiff

and

In
the

and

about

the

month

Counterclaimants

11

of

entered

January,
into

an

1985, the
agreement

whereby

Counterclaimants

would

forfeit

all

right,

title

interest in the subject real property and be released

and

from all

obligation in law and equity to pay any sums due and owing under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract heretofore referenced.
19.

In

and

about

the

month

of

January,

19 85,

the

Counterclaimants vacated said real property and tendered to the
Plaintiff a Quit-Claim Deed upon said real property and the key
to the dwelling.
20.

In

and

about

the

month

of

January,

Plaintiff took possession of said real property and
said

real

property

and

dwelling

for

sale

on

1985,

the

advertised

four

separate

occasions in the Salt Lake Tribune.
21.

Said

agreement

constitutes

an

accord

and

satisfication between the parties hereto.
22.

The Plaintiff has breached his agreement with the

Counterclaimants and has attempted to enforce the provisions of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract heretofore referenced.
23.
attorney's
Dollars

The Counterclaimants are entitled to all costs and

fees

incurred

herein

in

the

sum

of

Five

Thousand

($5,000.00), but subject to amendment at trial, pursuant

to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-56.
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimants pray

judgment

against

the Plaintiff as set forth below.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Rescission

of

the

Contract;

12

subject

Uniform

Real

Estate

2.

Restitution

of

all

sums

paid

by

the

Counterclaimants to the Plaintiff;
3.

Costs of suit and attorney's fees incurred herein

in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars

($5,000.00), but subject to

amendment at trial;
4.

Exemplary

damages

in

the

sum

of

Fifty

Thousand

Dollars ($50,000.00); and,
5.

Such other further relief as this court determines

just, equitable and proper.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Rescission

of

the

subject

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract;
2.

Judgment upon the accord and satisfaction entered

into between the parties;
3.

Release

in

law

and

equity

from

all

obligations

under said Uniform Real Estate Contract; and,
4.

Costs of suit and attorney's fees incurred herein

in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars

($5,000.00), but subject to

amendment at trial;
5.

Such other further relief as this court determines

just, equitable and proper^
DATED this ( //T

day ofJ4ay—-i£&^.

ANDREW B. BBJRRY\JR#
Attorney £<5r Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this cQ% day of May, 1985, I
mailed a true and correct cc py of the foregoing Answer and
Counterclaim, postage prepaid, to Raymond Scott Barry, attorney
for Plaintiff, at 900 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.
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ANDREW B. BERRY 0309
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR
Attorneys for Defendant
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: 967-3700
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DEPUTY CLE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STAN KATZ,
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

Civil No. C 85 1606
HOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendants.
ooOoo
COMES NOW the Defendants by and through their attorney,
Andrew B. Berry Jr., pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and for just, legal and factual
cause moves this Court for an Order setting aside Default and
Default Judgment previously entered in this action on the ground
that counsel for each of the parties were engaged in negotiation.
This motion is supported by the Affidavit, attached
hereto and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
DATED this /n

day of June, 1985.

/MDREW B. BERRY/fR.
Attorney for Dtff^ndants

0

CERTICIATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this | / day of June, 1985, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion, postage
prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff, at 900
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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BERRY, LARSEN & FARR
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Attorneys for Defendant
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone:
967-3700
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STAN KATZ,
A F F I D A V I T
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

N o . C 85

1606

HOMER F. WILKINSON
Defendants.
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Andrew B. Berry Jr., being first duly sworn upon my
oath, depose and say:
1.

I am an attorney at law in good standing and duly

authorized to practice law in the State of Utah.
2.
3.

I represent the Defendants herein.
The

facts

herein

stated

are

based

upon

my

knowledge and personal observations.
4.

I

had

engaged

in

several

conversations

with

Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for the Plaintiff, prior to the
commencement of these proceedings in an attempt to negotiate a
settlement of the parties respective claims.

5.

I made a settlement offer to Plaintiff's attorney

on behalf of the Defendants approximately one month prior to the
filing of Plaintiff's Complaint.
believed

said

offer

Plaintiff counsel stated he

acceptable

without the State of Utah.

but

that

the

Plaintiff

was

Said counsel stated he would advise

me of the Plaintiff's decision at the earliest possible date.
The Plaintiff's counsel failed to contact me thereafter.
Defendants, Alwin W. Pierce

and Vennadel

Pierce, were

The

served

with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons on or about the
30th day of March, 1985.
6.

The

Defendants, Allwin

W.

Pierce

and

Vennadel

Pierce, delivered said Summons and Complaint to me on the 5th
day of April, 1985.
7.

I immediately telephoned the Plaintiff's counsel

and tendered to him another offer of settlement at which time he
stated that he would contact the Plaintiff and then inform me of
the Plaintiff's decision regarding said offer.
8.
absence

of

Defendants'

On

or

about

acceptance
offer

of

or

the

17th

rejection

settlement,

day
by

of

the

April,

1985, in

Plaintiff

I contacted

the

of

the

Plaintiff's

counsel at which time he informed me that he had been unable to
convey

said

offer

to

the

Plaintiff

but would

do

so

at

the

earliest possible date.
9.

On

or

about

the

23rd

day

of

April,

1985,

I

received from the Plaintiff's counsel a letter stating that his
intention was to "actively

litigate" this matter.
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A copy of

said letter is attached hereto and incorporated as though fully
set forth herein.
10.

Said

letter

demanded

that

the

Plaintiff's

Complaint be answered prior to the 20th day of April, despite
the declaration of the Plaintiff's Summons that said Complaint
be answered within thirty

(30) days from the date of service

thereof.
11.

The Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby Larson,

reside without the State of Utah and have not been served with
the Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons herein.
12.

I

immediately

Defendants' Answer

and

commenced

Counterclaim

but

preparation

of

such preparation

the
was

difficult and time consuming inasmuch as two of the Defendants
named herein reside without the State of Utah.
13.

On

or

about

the

30th

day

of

May,

1985, the

Defendants answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and counterclaimed
against him.

A copy of the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim

is attached hereto and incorporated as though fully set forth
herein.
14.
the

The Plaintiff's counsel entered the default of

Defendants

despite

his

personal

knowledge

that

the

Defendants were represented by counsel and without informing me
that the default of the Defendants had been entered.
15.
from

the

entered

On or about the 4th day of June, 1985, I received

Plaintiff's
the

Default

attorney
of

my

a

letter

clients

3

stating

whereupon

that
I

he

had

immediately

commenced preparation of the pleadings necessary to set aside
said default wrongfully taken.
16.

I am of the opinion that the Defendants have a

valid defense to the claims of the Plaintiff and are entitled to
have their cause heard u p p ^ its merits,
DATED this l^j

day of JUJJS-T—t8ij5.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before mfe this
June, 19 85,

My Commission Expires:
8/28/85

Residing

Salt

day of

Lake

County,

CERTICIATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ]vj day of June, 1985, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the ' foregoing Affidavit,
postage prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff,
at 900 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111.

%k QMA
\
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ANDREW B. BERRY 0 309
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR
Attorneys for Defendant
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
<^tfhone: 967-3700

IN THE THIRD
V\0r^e

JUN

2B 3 38 W!'B5

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE' OF UTAH
OOOoo

STAN KATZ,
NOTICE OF HEARING
Plaintiff,
vs,
Civil No. C 85 1606

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

HOMER F. WILKINSON
Defendants.
00O00

TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY:

You

and

each

of

you

will

please

take

notice

that

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment has
been scheduled at the above-entitled Court, 451 South 200 East,
Salt

Lake

City,

Utah

84111,

before

the

Honorable

Wilkinson, Third Judicial District Court Judge, on the
of

<JULU

I

1985,

at

the

hour

of

jfK'QC tf »*"» , or

thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED this r i

day of Ju

-ANDREW B". BERRY JR.I
Attorney for Defendants

Homer

F.

iJo " day
as

soon

CERTICIATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this \\ day of June, 1985, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice, postage
prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff, at 900
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C-85-1606

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Plaintiff Stan Katz through his undersigned counsel,
hereby objects to Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and
Default Judgment dated June 14, 1985.

Plaintiff's objections

to said Motion are supported by the Affidavit of Raymond Scott
Berry attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference.
DATED thisrj / day of June, 1985.
GREEN & BERRY

Raymond Scott Berry' N
Attorney for Plaintiff,
JK4 3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss .
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Julie King, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed

in the offices of GREEN & BERRY

attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
Objection to Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and
Default Judgment upon the following parties by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Andrew B. Berry
Attorney for Defendants
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah
B4120

and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City,
Utah on the

r-y

day of June, 1985.

JXUU
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
June, 1985.

I^U^
Qoti~"
^IK

day of

Jotarv Public
N<
Residfnch'at Salt Lake City, Utah
My commission expires
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GREEN & BERRY
Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake^City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-5650

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT

vs.

Civil No. C-85-1606

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and RUBY
LARSON,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Raymond Scott Berry, being first duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney at law, in good standing and

duly authorized to practice law in the State of Utah.
2.

I represent the Plaintiff herein.

3.

The facts herein stated are based upon my own

knowledge and personal observations.
4.

I had engaged in several conversations with Andrew

Berry, attorney for Defendants, subsequent to the commencement
of these proceedings.

The subject of those conversations was
Paae -1-

whether Defendants Allwin W. and Vennadel Pierce would be
willing to pay any sum to settle the claims made in this
action.

Counsel Andrew Berry indicated durinq those

conversations he would discuss that matter with his clients.
5.

Andrew Berry at no time indicated to this Affiant

that his clients would be willing to pay anything to settle
this claim.
6.

At no time did this Affiant represent to Andrew

Berry that any "settlement offer" would be acceptable to
Plaintiff.

This is particularly true in light of the fact that

Defendants at no time made any settlement offer to the
Plaintiff.
7.

Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel were

served with Summons and Complaint in this action on or about
March 30, 1985.
8.

On or about April 17, 1985, this Affiant spoke to

Mr. Andrew Berry.

I indicated during that phone conversation

it was my intention to actively litigate this action, and
further indicating that I expected an answer from Mr. Berry
prior to the expiration of the time provided to answer.
9.

Mr. Berry did not ask for nor did this Affiant

grant Mr. Berry any extension of time in which to answer
Plaint iff's Complaint.
10.

That on or about April 22, 1985, this Affiant

wrote to Mr. Berry confirming our phone conversation of April

Page -2-

17, 1985 and indicated my intention to actively litigate the
action.

I indicated in that letter that I would be out of town

on April 18 through May 5, 1985, but that I had instructed my
office to review the file on April 20, 1985 and if no answer
had been received, to see that Entry of Default and Default
Judgment were submitted to the Court.
11.

A true and correct copy of ray letter dated April

22, 1985, to Mr. Andrew Berry is attached hereto and made a
part hereto and made a part hereof by reference as Affidavit
Exhibit "A".
12.

On April 22, 1985, an Entry of Default was

submitted to the court for the reason and on the grounds that
no answer had been filed by Defendants.

That Default was

actually entered on or about April 30, 1985.
13.

That on or about May 14, 1985, a Default Judgment

was submitted for entry by the court.

That Default Judgment

was actually entered by the court on or about May 17, 1985.
14.

That Mr. Andrew Berry at no time entered his

appearance in the above-entitled action prior to his filing of
a tardy Answer and Counterclaim on behalf of Defendants on or
about May 30, 1985.
DATED this rO
-V-£

STATE OF UTAH

)

/day of June, 1985.
{

Raymond Scott Berry X^
Affiant
/ )
f J
Paae - 3 -

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On the ry~ { day of June, 1985, before me, the
undersigned officer, personally appeared Raymond Scott Berry
who is known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to
the within instrument and individually acknowledged that he
executed the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
official seal this U^ / day of June, 1985.

CI \idu ¥}x\\&
My commission expires:

w

Notary Public y ' \~j
Residing at'-^Jntf^ ^\Ci/Cl
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GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
9 0 0 Nh WHOUSE BUILDING
10 EXCHANGE PLACE
SAL T LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
TELEPHONE (801) 3 6 3 - 5 6 5 0
R A Y M O N D SCOTT BERRY

p Q . BOX 1694, 8 4 1 1 0

EXHIBIT A

April 22, 1985

Andrew Berry
Attorney at Law
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah
RE:

84120

Katz vs. Pierce
Our file: K-119.18-85

Dear Mr. Berry:
Thank you for your phone call of April 17, 1985 in regard
to the above matter.
Unfortunately, I was unable to communicate with Mr. Katz
prior to his leaving town.
My current intention is to actively litigate this matter.
My file indicates that your answer is due on or before April 20,
1985. I will be out of town on April 18, through May 5, 1985.
However, I have instructed my office to review this file on April
20. If no answer has been received, I have instructed my staff
to see that a Entry of Default and Default Judgment is submitted
to the court.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
f"~"?>REEN &

V.3c
Raymond
RSB/jk

'ifUMBD]
hud

I v.«

i., -.-u i ,i Uv*

GREEN & BERRY

Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiff
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-5650
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs .

Civil No. C-85-1606

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and RUBY
LARSON,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came
on regularly for hearing pursuant to Notice on July 26, 1985 at
10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.
Raymond Scott Berry appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Stan Katz.
Counsel for the Defendants, Andrew Berry, did not appear on the
grounds that he has been involved in a trial held before the
Honorable Dean Conder.

For this reason, and good cause

appearing therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, AJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default

Judgment was continued without date without prejudice to either
party.
Paae - 1 -

day of -drf^f, 1985.
BY THE COURT;

e of the District Court

<-- jrS~ ~

/6*£
ATTEST
H. DIXON HtMOLTV

DapvtyCtv*

Paae
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Julie King, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY
attorneys for Plaintiffs herein, that she served the attached
Order upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Andrew B. Berry
Attorney for Defendants
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City,
Utah on the

Q O

day of^jmefy 1985.

c

\ l u Y^kXcx

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
July, 1985.

Bf-j-^

day of

Notary Puplici
Residing W(s_|lt Lake City, Utah
My commission expires:

JMM

Q/f$?

_.*}_

FIlFOINCtfFfS OFPCE

ANDREW B. BERRY 0309
BERRY, LARSEN & FARR
Attorneys for Defendant
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Va^Aey City, Utah 84120
J^pj$»ne: 967-3700

\\0

S

i m . fp • g^
'
>d"j'.,--,'•;/ c: ^Kf
iA '.«.,", i>--' -/'-""' „ ^.„ )
/vil'?:^iH_i^--~-ii^
r:;::rCLERK
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo

STAN KATZ,
NOTICE OF HEARING
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

Civil No. C 85 1606
HOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendants.
ooOoo
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY:

You and each of you will please

take notice

that

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment has
been scheduled at the above-entitled Court, 451 South 200 East,
Salt

Lake

City,

Utah

84111, before

the

Honorable

Homer

F.

Wilkinson, Third Judicial District Court Judge, on the j££k

day

°f ffcuftuuLoT" i

soon

1985, at

the

hour

of jQidti

/^.-m. , or

thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED this

?C,

day of July, 1985.

ANDREW B,

Attorney

fap'"Defendants

as

CERTICIATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this zJ day of July, 1985, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice, postage
prepaid, to Raymond Scott Berry, attorney for Plaintiff, at 900
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and to Andy Childs, Judge Wilkinson's Clerk, at 240 East Fourth
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

] OlUt>-n

GREEN & BERRY
Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-5650

wracJia!^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STAN KATZ,

)
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.
ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM

Civil No. C85-1606
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Plaintiff Stan Katz answers, denies and otherwise
responds to the Counterclaim of Defendants filed herein as
follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants' Counterclaim fails to state a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiff responds to the specific allegations set
forth in Defendant's Counterclaim as follows:
1.

The following Paragraphs of Defendants'

Counterclaim are admitted:
2.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 19.

The allegations set forth in the remaining

paragraphs of Defendants' Counterclaim are denied.
3.

Plaintiff specifically denies each and every
Paqe 1

allegation set forth in Defendants' Counterclaim not
specifically admitted above.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendants'
Counterclaim be dismissed, no cause of action, and that
Plaintiff be awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and costs
of Court incurred in defense of the same.
DATED this r^L/day of August, 1985.
GREEN & BERRY

1A

Raymond Scott Berry
Attorney for Plaint:
JK48

Paae 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)ss.
)

Julie King, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
Reply to Counterclaim upon the following parties by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Andrew Berry
Attorney at Law
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley, Utah 84120
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage
prepaid
thereon,
in
States Mail at Salt Lake City,
pLCpaiU
UIltJLtJUH,
±11 the
UI1C United
UI
Utah on t h e

August,

[7&LuZ\\6ay

oi>f August, 1985.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o beforel/me t h i s
1985.

^ ' \"JUddaayy

ol
of

C

Lake City, Utah
My commission expires:

FILED IN C L E W S OFFIPE
Salt Lake County, Utah

AUGfc6 1965

GREEN S, BERRY

Raymond Scott Berry (0311)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-5650

Deputy'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,

)
ORDER

vs.
i

ALLWIN W. PIERCE, VENNADEL
PIERCE, KENT S. LARSON and
RUBY LARSON,

)
)
)

Civil No. C85-1606
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

)

Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came
on regularly for hearing pursuant to Notice on August 16, 1985
at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge,
presiding.

Raymond Scott Berry appeared on behalf of the

Plaintiff Stan Katz.
Defendants.

Andrew Berry appeared on behalf of the

The Court reviewed the pleadings on file, and

entertained the arguments of counsel.

Good cause appearing

therefore, this Court orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:
1.

Defendants1 Motion to Set Aside the Default

Judgment dated March 15, 1985 is hereby denied.
DATED t h i s

/-

^

ATTEST

day of August, 1985.
BY THE COURT;

H. DIXON HINDUE*
udge of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Julie Kingf being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
Order upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Andrew B. Berry
Attorney at Law
100 Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West
West Valley, Utah 84120
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City,
Utah on the

J^fj}^

day of August, 1985.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
August, 1985.

day of

Notary PtjbjLic
ResidinqJ^4 Salt Lake City, Utah
My commission expires:

